Every claim Amanah makes is checkable. The checks below run client-side, on your machine, against the exact bytes the Casper contracts accepted — then you can tamper with the inputs and watch the proofs break.
Why this page exists. The main criticism of zero-knowledge proof-of-reserves is asymmetric verifiability— the cryptography is strong, but non-technical users can't inspect it, so only auditors can really check it (arXiv 2606.08211). You shouldn't need to read a paper to falsify our claim: press a tamper button and watch the proof fail. See RESEARCH.md for the sources behind each control.
Every hash on this page is a claim. Paste ANY Casper testnet deploy hash — one of ours, or any other — and this checks it against the chain: is it an Amanah contract, and did it execute or get refused by which control? You don't have to trust our list.
Solvency has two halves — assets AND liabilities — so both are checked here: the hidden per-asset allocations must sum to the claimed total (assets), and that total must cover the locked principal (our liability). Neither individual amount is revealed. Below is the Pedersen+Schnorr proof the on-chain verifier accepted; your browser re-derives the generator H, recomputes the Fiat–Shamir challenge, and checks s·H = proof_T + c·(ΣC − T·G).
loading proof…Every decision blob is blake2b-256 hashed and that hash is Ed25519-signed and verified INSIDE the AttestationLog contract before it is recorded. Your browser hashes the published blob and compares it to what was attested on-chain.
loading blob…These aren't diagrams. Each is a transaction that was REFUSED by a contract on casper-test — open any of them and read the revert.
Source: web/lib/zk-verify.ts (this page's verifier) · contracts/src/zk_reserves.rs (the on-chain verifier). Same maths, two independent implementations.